Job Market Paper:
"Politics and information in economic reforms"
Abstract: Why do economic reforms follow different patterns? Why are some reforms abandoned, some recklessly assume the form of a "big bang," while some proceed through careful experimentation? A formal model addresses these questions by analyzing political incentives of competing politicians and the effect of these incentives on the information they seek. Three main results are derived. First, economic reforms can entail smaller or larger political stakes and different degrees of politicization can lead to reform gridlock, or result in imprudent big-bang implementation, or encourage careful implementation through experimentation. Second, if reform policies are tested through experiments, the level of politicization affects the information these experiments produce. Third, contingent on their factional alignments and the status quo of economy, politicians have incentives to increase or reduce political stakes as a tactic to advance their interests. Politics matters in the process of economic reforms and it matters through shaping politicians' incentives to seek information about the efficacy of reform policies.
"Politics and information in economic reforms"
Abstract: Why do economic reforms follow different patterns? Why are some reforms abandoned, some recklessly assume the form of a "big bang," while some proceed through careful experimentation? A formal model addresses these questions by analyzing political incentives of competing politicians and the effect of these incentives on the information they seek. Three main results are derived. First, economic reforms can entail smaller or larger political stakes and different degrees of politicization can lead to reform gridlock, or result in imprudent big-bang implementation, or encourage careful implementation through experimentation. Second, if reform policies are tested through experiments, the level of politicization affects the information these experiments produce. Third, contingent on their factional alignments and the status quo of economy, politicians have incentives to increase or reduce political stakes as a tactic to advance their interests. Politics matters in the process of economic reforms and it matters through shaping politicians' incentives to seek information about the efficacy of reform policies.
Publications:
"Why are the fastest growing countries autocracies,"
Journal of Politics, Forthcoming, 2018, with Adam Przeworski.
"Strategies of election rigging: trade-offs, determinants, and consequences,"
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 13(1), 1-28, 2018, with Arturas Rozenas.
"The election monitor's curse,"
American Journal of Political Science, 62(1), 148-160, 2018, with Arturas Rozenas.
"Why are the fastest growing countries autocracies,"
Journal of Politics, Forthcoming, 2018, with Adam Przeworski.
"Strategies of election rigging: trade-offs, determinants, and consequences,"
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 13(1), 1-28, 2018, with Arturas Rozenas.
"The election monitor's curse,"
American Journal of Political Science, 62(1), 148-160, 2018, with Arturas Rozenas.
Working Papers:
"Subversion by stealth: dynamics of democratic backsliding,"
Working Paper, 2018, with Adam Przeworski.
"Leadership styles and survival strategies of Chinese Communist Party elites,"
Working Paper, 2018, with Junyan Jiang.
"Discriminatory persuasion,"
Working Paper, 2017.
"Authoritative leadership."
Working Paper, 2017.
"Ruling the ruling coalition: information control and autocratic governance,"
Working Paper, 2017, with Arturas Rozenas.
"One-party state,"
Working Paper, 2017, with Adam Przeworski.
"Subversion by stealth: dynamics of democratic backsliding,"
Working Paper, 2018, with Adam Przeworski.
"Leadership styles and survival strategies of Chinese Communist Party elites,"
Working Paper, 2018, with Junyan Jiang.
"Discriminatory persuasion,"
Working Paper, 2017.
"Authoritative leadership."
Working Paper, 2017.
"Ruling the ruling coalition: information control and autocratic governance,"
Working Paper, 2017, with Arturas Rozenas.
"One-party state,"
Working Paper, 2017, with Adam Przeworski.
Work in Progress:
"Governing like China," 2018, with Junyan Jiang.
"Economic reform and political struggle," 2018, with Shuo Chen and Tianyang Xi.
"Governing like China," 2018, with Junyan Jiang.
"Economic reform and political struggle," 2018, with Shuo Chen and Tianyang Xi.